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ABSTRACT
On August 5, 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association introduced its plan to end
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change their offensive nicknames and mascots and were forced to stop using trademarks
bearing Native American imagery. The NCAA ban presents the question of whether
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trademark. This comment evaluates those two interpretations as applied to the NCAA
Native American ban, and proposes that courts adopt the second interpretation because of
the unfair restraints the ban imposes on a school's established trademark.
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HONORING TRADEMARKS: THE BATTLE TO PRESERVE NATIVE AMERICAN
IMAGERY IN THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
IAN BOTNICK*
The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to this - as judges have

repeated again and again -that one merchant shall not divert customers
from another by representing what he sells as emanating from the
second ....The law often ignores the nicer sensibilities.1
- Judge Learned Hand

INTRODUCTION

On August 5, 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA')2
changed the face of college athletics. On that day, the NCAA announced its plan "to
prohibit NCAA colleges and universities from displaying hostile and abusive
racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or imagery at any of the [eighty4
eight] NCAA championships." ' 3 While some have questioned the NCAA's demands,
no school has challenged the NCAA Native American mascot and imagery ban on a

*J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. Political Science, University
of Illinois, December 2005. Thanks to Professor Doris Long, Professor Steven Schwinn, and Mr. E.
Leonard Rubin. Finally, thank you to Blake Nickles, Cory Tadlock, and the staff of The John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their invaluable editorial assistance.
I Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1928).
2 See generally NCAA EXECUTIVE COMM., NCAA STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2004), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/planning/StrategicPlan5.pdf [hereinafter NCAA STRATEGIC PLAN] (laying out
the objectives and purposes of the NCAA). The NCAA is a national organization made up of over
one thousand colleges and universities from around the United States.
NCAA, Current
Composition, http://www.neaa.org/wps/neaa?ContentlD=811 (last visited Sep. 3, 2008). Its purpose
is to govern the athletic program for each member institution and instill values that are essential to
the educational experience of the student athlete. NCAA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra,at 3.
3 Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Executive Committee
Issue Guidelines for Use of Native
American
Mascots
at
Championship
Events
(Aug.
5,
2005),
available
at
http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media-and-events/press-room/2005/august/20050805 -exec-comm-rls.h
tml [hereinafter NCAA Mascot Guidelines]. Though announced August 5, 2005, the prohibition was
not effective until February 1, 2006. Id. The ban originally targeted eighteen colleges displaying
such imagery, though other schools were added to the list at a later date and some were granted
exceptions or changed their mascot and imagery. See id

See Ryan Fulda, Is the NCAA Prohibitionon Native American Mascots from Championship
Play a Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act?, 31 Am.INDIAN L. REV. 163, 181-86 (2006) (analyzing
whether the NCAA's mascot policy unreasonably restrains free trade and whether it violates the
antitrust laws); Kenneth B. Franklin, Note, A Brave Attempt: Can the National Collegiate Athletic

Association Sanction Colleges and Universities with Native American Mascots?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 435, 457-63 (2006) (discussing the Sherman Antitrust Act's effect on the NCAA mascot policy);

see also Brian R. Moushegian, Comment, Native American Mascots' Last Stand? Legal Difficulties
in EliminatingPublic University Use of Native American Mascots, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 465,
475-76 (2006) (predicting that possible challenges to a school's use of Native American imagery will
likely fail).
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trademark basis because of the legal insufficiency of such a claim. 5 However, there
are different interpretations regarding the purpose of trademark law,6 and if a court
favors one purpose over the other, a school may have a valid trademark cause of
action against the NCAA.
This comment explores the different views regarding the purpose of trademark
law and evaluates the impact each interpretation has on the trademark rights of
colleges and universities affected by the NCAA's Native American mascot and
imagery ban. Part I provides information regarding the NCAA mascot and imagery
policy.
It also provides information concerning trademarks, including the
development of trademark rights and the different interpretations regarding the
purpose of trademark law. Part II analyzes the effect each interpretation has on the
NCAA's policy. Part III concludes with a proposition that courts follow the
interpretation favoring a school's goodwill and investment in its trademarks.
Consequently, Part III proposes that the NCAA ban be stricken and that schools be
entitled to use their established marks free from interference.

I. BACKGROUND

The NCAA Native American mascot and imagery ban and the use of Native
American imagery in general encompasses many social and legal issues, including
civil rights, the First Amendment, and even intellectual property. 7 The following
section provides information concerning the NCAA policy, including details and
criticisms. It also provides general information regarding trademarks and the
different interpretations regarding the purpose of trademark law.

5 See William N. Wright, Note, Not in Whose Name&."EvidentiaryIssues in Legal Challenges
to Native American Team Names and Maseots, 40 CONN. L. REV. 279, 292-96 (2007) (describing the
diminished effect of a trademark claim against the NCAA in light of recent case law); Steve Wieberg,
North Dakota Needs Tribes' OK for Nickname, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2007, at 13C; see also Press
Release, NCAA, Native American Mascot Policy - Status List (Feb. 16, 2007), available at
http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/media-and-events/press-room/2007/february/20070220-mascot-statusreport.html [hereinafter NCAA Status List]; UNIV. OF ILL., NCAA MASCOT POLICY FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (Feb. 16, 2007), http://www.uillinois.edu/chief/FAQ.pdf (noting that the
University of Illinois is currently researching the trademark laws regarding its rights, but no action
has been taken yet).
G 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 3:1-12

(4th ed. 2007) (noting the dual purpose of trademarks is to differentiate products in commerce and
identify ownership of a particular mark); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (noting that a trademark
is a designation used "to identify and distinguish" the goods); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (noting the purpose of trademarks is to identify ownership and
differentiate products in the market place).
7 See Fulda, supra note 4, at 181-86; Franklin, supra note 4, at 457-73; Moushegian, supra
note 4, at 475-76.
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A. The NCAA s Native American Mascot and Imagery Ban
The NCAA is an organization composed of over one thousand colleges and
universities from around the United States. 8 In addition to governing athletics, the
NCAA instills a sense of community awareness and social integrity in studentathletes. 9 One of the best examples of the NCAA's mission is the Native American
mascot and imagery ban. 10
According to the ban, colleges and universities will be prohibited "from
displaying hostile and abusive racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or
imagery at any of the [eighty-eight] NCAA championships."11
The ban also
recommends other schools not schedule events with schools that have not complied
with the policy. 12 As of February 16, 2007, five schools were granted exemptions,
eleven changed their mascot, nickname or imagery, three were still subject to the
13
policy, and one was placed on a five-year watch-period.
While the policy notes that schools are free to adopt any mascot and imagery
they wish and provides schools with an appeal process, 14 the general NCAA rules say
that a school's membership may be revoked for failing to comply with NCAA
policies.15 Thus, arguably, the NCAA has given the schools an ultimatum: either
comply with the NCAA regulations or be removed from the NCAA.16
The ban has received much criticism since its inception, including allegations
that the ban violates civil rights, First Amendment, and anti-trust laws. 17 The ban
also contains possible trademark law violations, although no school has challenged
18
the ban on such grounds.
The primary trademark argument against the policy is that it forces schools to
change or abandon their established marks, names, and images. 19 While the NCAA
has not created a mark to compete with the marks of the colleges and universities, it

8 NCAA, Current Composition, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentID=811 (last visited Sep.
3, 2008).
9NCAA STRATEGIC PLAN, supranote 2, at 3.
10See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 ("All institutions are encouraged to promote
[cultural diversity] and take proactive steps at every NCAA event through institutional event
management to enhance the integrity of intercollegiate athletics related to these issues."). The press
release notes that the policy stemmed from a June 2005 meeting of the NCAA Minority Opportunity
and Interest Committee, which met to discuss ongoing debate surrounding the Confederate Battle
Flag and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' statements regarding the use of Native American
imagery at sporting events. Id.
11Id.
12Id.
13 NCAA Status List, supra note 5.
11NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supranote 3.
15NCAA, 2007-08 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
303-11
(2007),
available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/2007-08 dl manua1252fcd8c-6808-411c-a72900db52d6a783.pdf.
1c See id
17 See Fulda,

supranote 4, at 181-86; Franklin, supra note 4, at 457-63..
See Wright, supra note 5, at 292-96 (noting the difficulty in making a trademark claim
against the NCAA Native American mascot and imagery policy).
19See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (discussing the requirements each school must
satisfy to be in compliance with the policy).
18
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has effectively deprived each school the use of its trademark. 20 Accordingly, the ban
presents the question of whether a trademark owner's ability to bring a trademark
cause of action against the NCAA may be enforced based solely on an owner's
goodwill, investment and reputation.

B. General TrademarkInformation
Trademarks are words, symbols or phrases used to differentiate one's product in
commerce and identify ownership of that particular product. 21 In their broadest
sense, trademark rights are a kind of property right. 22 As such, a trademark owner
has the exclusive right to use and enjoy a mark so long as that use does not interfere
23
with the rights of another trademark owner.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") administers the
federal laws governing patents and trademarks. 24 Under the Lanham Act of 1946
("the Act"), the USPTO registers and regulates trademarks. 25 The Act details the
federal registration procedure of trademarks and sets out the causes of action and
remedies available to federally registered trademark owners. 26 However, it is
important to note that the Act does not create a property right encompassed in a
trademark; it merely describes how a particular mark can be registered and the
causes of action available to an owner. 27
20 See

id.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 3; see also
Anne Hiaring, Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW
2006, at 13 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No.
9024, 2006) ("Trademarks and service marks are those words, symbols, phrases or designs which the
public associates with a single source of goods or services.").
22 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Aunt Jemima Mills
Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 2:14.
23 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:10-14; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115 ("Any registration issued
under the Act shall be prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered
mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration ... ");
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The
hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.").
24 MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1 (2000). The USPTO is an agency in the
Department of Commerce. Id.
25 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (proscribing the general rules for federal trademark
registration and regulation). The Lanham Act is divided into three sections: the Principal Register,
the Supplemental Register, and the General Provisions. Id. Sections 1051-1072 compose the
Principal Register, §§ 1091-1096 compose the Supplemental Register, and §§ 1111-1127 compose
the General Provisions. Id. Besides the actual section numbers listed in the United States Code,
the Lanham Act is commonly referred to by different section numbers, one through forty-five. Id.
26 Id.
27 See La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 n.5
(2d Cir 1974) ("The Lanham Act does not create the trademark right; it only recognizes the right
acquired through use."); Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 904
(C.C.P.A. 1969) ([T]he Lanham Act ... is for the registration, not the creation, of trademarks.");
Smith v. Dental Prods. Co., 140 F.2d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1944) ("N]o property right is concluded by
the registration of a trade-mark."); ; see also Hiaring, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that the common
law doctrine of first use is the sole means of establishing ownership in the United States even
though a trademark can be registered under both federal and state laws). Accordingly, a trademark
21
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The two main causes of action available to a trademark owner under the
Lanham Act are infringement and dilution. 28
Trademark infringement cases
typically involve one party using a mark similar to another already in use. 29 Many
cases, however, discuss the possibility of a valid infringement claim even if the
30
plaintiff and the defendant have different products or target different markets.
Consequently, there is no set of rules to determine the boundaries of an infringement
action. 31
The other main cause of action available to a trademark owner is a dilution
claim.

32

A mark can be diluted in one of two ways: blurring or tarnishing. 33 A mark

is blurred when someone uses a famous mark on products in an entirely different
market, such as the Kodak trademark on a piano. 34 Alternatively, a mark is
tarnished when someone uses the famous mark on an inferior product, thereby
owner attains protection and the exclusive right to use a trademark only when the trademark is
used in commerce, regardless of registration with a state, the federal government, or both. Hiaring,
supra note 21, at 14.
28 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (infringement); id. § 1125 (dilution).
29 Id. § 1114 (detailing the exact requirements for a trademark infringement claim); see also
generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 23:1-23:90 (noting the difficulties with trademark
infringement are determining whether the contested mark bears a close enough resemblance to the
original mark so as to confuse the consumer and deciding whether another needs to actually
compete with or even use a mark against an owner).
30 See Perfection Fence Corp. v. Fiber Composites LLC, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1371-72
(D. Mass. 2005) (holding that the likelihood of confusion standard applies to all infringement cases
regardless of different products or markets); May v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 10 F. Supp. 249,
255-56 (D. Mass. 1935) (evaluating whether a party to a suit needs to be in direct competition with
another to have a valid infringement claim); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24:24 ("The protection
which the law gives the owner of a trade-mark is not confined to the goods upon which it is, or has
been, used by the owner of it but extends to products which would be reasonably thought by the
buying public to come from the same source if sold under the same mark."); see also E.H.
Schopflocher, Annotation, Actual Competition as Necessary Element of TrademarkInfringement or
Unfair Competition, 148 A.L.R. 12, 14 (1944) (introducing the debate between those who think
competition is necessary for a trademark cause of action and those who do not).
31 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 23:2.
32 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (detailing the exact requirements for a dilution claim); see also 4
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 24:93-134. The first federal anti-dilution law was the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1996 ("FTDA"). Id. Until 1996, there were no federal anti-dilution
provisions, even though such provisions existed in some states. Id. Since then, the 2006 Trade
Dilution Revision Act ("TDRA") has amended the FTDA. Id. The provisions detailed in the TDRA
have been adopted and included in the Lanham Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); see also TCPIP
Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting the purpose of the
Dilution Act "isto protect owners of famous marks from the kind of dilution that is permitted by the
trademark law when a junior user uses the same mark in a non-confusing way in an unrelated area
of commerce").
334 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 24:69-70; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 21, § 25.
34 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 24:69, 84-88, 99, 101 (discussing the concept and
requirements for blurring); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995) (providing three examples of
actionable dilution: DuPont on shoes, Buick on aspirin, and Kodak on pianos); Recent Cases:
Trademark Law - FederalTrademarkDilution Act - Sixth Circuit Holds That Plaintiffs Need Not
Show Actual Harm To Prove Dilution - V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Ci±,
2001), 115 HARv. L. REV. 731, 734 (2001) [hereinafter Recent Cases:V Secret Catalogue] (blurring
occurs "when a noncompetitor uses the same or a similar mark in conjunction with an unrelated
product").
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harming the reputation of the famous mark. 35 The difficulty with dilution is
determining whether a mark has actually been diluted and whether an opponent's
36
use of a mark is necessary.

C. Trademark Interpretation-The

Competing Views Regarding the DualFunetions
of Trademarks

Though there are differences between the infringement and dilution causes of
action, the purpose behind each action is to prohibit unfair competition and "promote
economic efficiency." 37

Accordingly, the principles of unfair competition provide a

foundation for trademark law. 38
The difficulty in unfair competition law is
determining whether those principles have been violated. 39 Some courts hold that
40
actual competition and usage is required to violate the rights of a trademark owner.
Other courts hold that actual competition and opponent usage are not required, and
instead validate protection when an opponent has impacted a trademark owner's
goodwill and reputation. 41 Below is a detailed analysis regarding these two
35 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 24:70, 89-92, 101 (discussing the concept and requirements
for tarnishment); see also Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods, Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507-08 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark will suffer negative
associations through defendant's use."); Recent Cases: V Secret Catalogue, supra note 34, at 734

(tarnishing occurs "when a noncompetitor uses the same or similar mark to advertise an inferior or
offensive product").
36 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 24:67 ("Because it is largely a theoretical and almost
ephemeral concept, the legal theory of 'dilution' is exceedingly difficult to explain and understand.");
see also Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003) ("Unlike traditional
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
37 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of TrademarkLaw, 78 TRADEMARK
REP. 267, 267 (1988) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw] (citing WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); see also GORDON V. SMITH,
TRADEMARK VALUATION, 37-38 (1997) (discussing the numerous important roles of trademarks in
today's society, including assisting customers in identifying a product and assuring a certain amount

of quality in a product); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 3:1-12 (noting the purposes of trademarks is
to identify a particular product, guarantee the quality of a product, and advertise a product);
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Uso 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992) [hereinafter Posner,
Parodjj ('A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a compact, memorable,
and unambiguous identifier of a product or service."); DANA SHILLING, ESSENTIALS OF TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 12-13 (2002) (emphasizing the convenient purpose of trademarks in
today's market economy).
38 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); see also Am. Steel
Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926) ("[T]he general purpose of [unfair competition] is to
prevent one person from passing off his goods or his business as the goods or business of another.");
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:1-6 (noting that the purpose behind unfair competition in the
United States is to promote a free market economy and encourage competition).
'39 See Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 14 (noting the difficulty involved in balancing one's
investment and the need for a free market economy).
40Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2003); Gen.
Banking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., 90 F.2d 241, 242 (7th Cir. 1937); Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 1821.
41See Schopflocher, supranote 30, at 22 (noting the increasing trend of the courts in expanding
the legal remedies available to an owner and basing such a remedy not on actual competition but
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competing views.

1. Preventative TrademarkLaw Based on Use and Consumer Perception
One interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark law is concerned with
preventing opponent usage and consumer confusion. 42
As discussed in Star
FinaneialServices, Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage Corp.,43 "[tihe purpose of trademark laws
[sic] is to prevent the use of the same or similar marks in a way that confuses the
public about the actual source of the goods or service." 44
Proponents of this
interpretation believe a trademark owner's exclusive right to use a mark is violated
only when another mark is used in commercial competition against the preexisting
mark. 45 In other words, a trademark owner can only claim infringement or dilution
46
when a defendant actually uses a similar or identical mark in commerce.
47
Support for this line of reasoning is found in the language of the Lanham Act.
It states a defendant must use a mark in commerce to be held liable to the trademark
48
owner; if there is no competition and opponent usage, there is no liability.

rather ethical business practices); see also Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 256 F.3d 1050,
1059 (10th Cir. 2001) (Baldock, J., dissenting) ("[C]ompetition is not a prerequisite to recovery of
profits."); Phillips v. Governor & Co. of Adventurers of Eng. Trading into Hudson Bay, 79 F.2d 971,
974 (9th Cir. 1935) (rejecting the defense that competition between the parties is an essential
element for an infringement action).
42See Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 37, at 272 (noting the primary purpose of
trademark law is to assist the consumer in differentiating one product from another); see also Canal
Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322 (1872) ("The office of a trade-mark is to point out distinctively the
origin, or ownership of the article to which it is affixed; or, in other words, to give notice who was the
producer."); Farouk Sys. v. Target Corp., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1221, 1223-24 (5th Cir. Jan. 22,
2008) ([T]he touchstone of trademark law is consumer confusion."); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of
the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir. 1976) (C[T]rademark laws exist not to 'protect'
trademarks, but.., to protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the
trademark owner's right to a non-confused public.").
43 89 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1996).
44 Id. at 9.

45 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916) ("[S]ince it is the trade, and
not the mark, that is to be protected, a trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of
municipalities or states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader's goods have
become known and identified by his use of the mark."); Am. Express Co. v. Goetz, 515 F.3d 156, 161
(2d Cir. 2008), No. 07-1595 (U.S. petition for cert. filedJun. 23, 2008); Emergency One, Inc. v. Am.
Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267-69 (4th Cir. 2003); Mattel Inc., v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806-07 (9th Cir. 2003).
46 See Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 19-21 (noting the early view of trademark protection
required actual competition or diversion of trade).
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2006). According to the statute, anyone who uses a mark in
commerce that is a reproduction, copy, or imitation of an existing mark is liable for infringement.
Id. Additionally, anyone who uses a mark in a manner that will likely confuse or misrepresent the
original mark is liable for dilution. Id.
48Id.; see also Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973 (2d Cir. 1928) ("The law of unfair
trade comes down very nearly to this ... that one merchant shall not divert customers from another
by representing what he sells as emanating from the second."); Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 19-21
(recognizing the cases that required actual competition for trademark violations).
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Additional support for this view is found in the elements for each cause of action. 49
For an infringement claim, the injured party must show there is a likelihood of
consumer confusion between the established mark and the defendant's mark. 50 For a
dilution claim, the injured party must show the defendant either blurred or tarnished
51
the plaintiffs mark, thus implicitly requiring the defendant to use a mark.
Arguably, the elements for an infringement and dilution claim require a defendant to
use a mark, thus, providing further support for the first interpretation.
Courts following this approach have established a high standard that a
trademark owner must meet in order to qualify for protection. The rights of a
trademark owner are severely limited as a result of this interpretation, because an
owner can only assert a right when the defendant has used a mark in an infringing
and diluting manner. Nonetheless, a majority of cases involve an opponent adversely
using a mark, and thus, the majority approach appears to follow this
interpretation. 52

2. Protective Trademark Law Based on Goodwill and Reputation
The second interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark law is concerned
with protecting the owner's goodwill and business reputation. 53 Proponents of this
line of reasoning recognize the value of an owner's financial investment in a mark
and reward it with protection even when another does not use the same or a similar
mark. 54 As the court stated in Maison Prunier v. Prunier'sRestaurant and Cafe,
49 See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 43 (1st Cir. 1998) (identifying the
factors a court uses in determining whether a party has a valid trademark infringement action).
5oId.; see also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1878) ("Where the similarity is sufficient
to convey a false impression to the public mind, and is of a character to mislead and deceive the
ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution in such matters, it is sufficient to
give the injured party a right to redress ....
); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 23:1-124 (discussing
the likelihood of confusion standard for infringement claims).
51 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (explaining the element of dilution); see also Tiffany & Co. v.
Boston Club, Inc., 231 F.Supp. 836, 843-44 (D. MASS. 1964) (providing an example of the dilution
elements); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 21, § 25; 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 6, §§ 24:69, 84-88, 99, and 101.
52 E.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); Am. Express Co. v.
Goetz, 515 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2008), No. 07-1595 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Jun. 23, 2008);
Coty, Inc. v. Prestonettes, Inc., 3 F.2d 984, 985 (2d Cir. 1924); iP. Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 35; see
also Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 13-18.
' See Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 22-26 (noting the trend of courts to expand the legal
remedy available to trademark owners and award protection to owners based on an owner's
investment and the fundamental concept of fairness as opposed to the public's perception); see also
Future Farmers of Am. v. Romack, 114 F. Supp. 796, 802 (E.D. Ill. 1953), affid, 211 F.2d 925 (7th
Cir. 1954) ("Trademarks and the right to their exclusive use are property rights in the sense that the
right to one's trade and goodwill that follows from it free from unwarranted interference from others
is a property right.").
54 See Defiance Button Machine Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1060 (2nd Cir.
1985) ("As long as the mark has significant remaining value and the owner intends to use it in
connection with substantially the same business or service, the public is not deceived."); Standard
Oil Co. of N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1932) (holding that a
defendant does not need to be in competition with the plaintiff to be held liable for trademark
infringement); Kotabs, Inc. v. Kotex Co., 50 F.2d 810, 813 (3d Cir. 1931) (noting competition is not
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Inc., 55 "forward strides in trademark protection are being attained by appeals to
'good conscience' and 'judicial sensibilities' rather than to strictly legal principles
56
derived from a critical analysis of the real tort involved."
Support for this second interpretation is based on the fundamental concept of
fairness, as opposed to competition. 57 Under this view, taking away the right to use
a mark from an individual who has invested time and money in that mark would be
unfair and unethical. 58 It could even be argued that the Lanham Act was founded
upon fairness, thus the second approach deserves more recognition regardless of the
explicit language found in the Act. 59 As the court noted in Summit Machine Tool
Manufacturing Corp. v. Victor CNC Systems, Inc., 60 "the Lanham Act 'has
progressed far beyond the old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any
form of competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts of
61
"fairness.""'
62
Further support for this interpretation can be found in the line of Harjo cases.
In those cases, the petitioners, a group of Native Americans, petitioned the USPTO to
cancel six trademarks containing Native American imagery, including the
63
established mark of the Washington Redskins, a professional football team.
Originally, the Trial Trademark and Appeal Board ("TTAB") granted the petitioner's
motion and cancelled the trademarks, concluding that the marks were disparaging of
Native Americans. 64 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia overturned the TTAB's decision.6 5 The court there held that the

necessarily a requirement for an infringement cause of action); see also Schopflocher, supra note 30,
at 22-26 (discussing the value encompassed in a trademark and analyzing the cases that suggest
protection should be awarded irrespective of competition).
55288 N.Y.S. 529 (1936).
56 Id. at 533 (quoting Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Proteetion, 40
HARv. L. REV. 813, 813 (1926)).
57 See Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924) ("[T]here is no fetish
in the word 'competition.' The invocation of equity rests more vitally upon the unfairness."); Stork
Rest., Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Supp. 90, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1941) ([T]he
emphasis in cases
concerning. . . 'unfair competition' is no longer on competition, but rather on the injury suffered by
the plaintiff ..

").

F8 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 276 (suggesting a trademark
deserves protection based solely on the amount time the owner spent creating, advertising, and
promoting the mark); see also SMITH, supra note 37, at 129-58 (discussing the idea that the value of
a trademark is based on an owner's investment in the mark and goodwill in developing the mark).
59 Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 207 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946) (noting the general purpose of the Lanham Act
is "to secure trade-mark owners in the goodwill which they have built up .... "). According to the
legislative history, the original purpose of the Lanham Act was to "encourage the maintenance of
quality by securing to the producer the benefit of a good reputation which excellence creates." Id. at
4.
(307 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993).
61 Id. at 1437 (quoting Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981)).
62 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828 (T.T.A.B. 1994), revd, 284 F. Supp. 2d
96 (D.D.C. 2003), affd, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This was the first case in a long line of cases
involving the petitioners requesting the USPTO cancel six trademarks containing Native American
imagery. Id.
(33 d
(34 d

(35Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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established commercial history of the trademarks in question outweighed the
petitioners' cancellation claim. 66 The decision suggests that an owner's goodwill and
investment in a mark deserve protection regardless of whether a defendant has used
a mark against an owner.
Although much of the support for this interpretation comes from dicta,6 7 there
are some cases and authorities suggesting this approach is well-founded. 68 As
".."69
Schopflocher noted, "actual competition is no longer the essential test .
Though few cases have been decided solely on this basis, it will likely gain the
attention of more courts in the future because it greatly expands the rights of owners
and provides them with a means of recourse when other theories fail.
Overall, each interpretation is designed to protect a trademark owner's rights
and promote the dual function of trademarks.0 However, as discussed below, an
owner's rights may be drastically affected if one interpretation is favored over the
other.

II. ANALYSIS
Trademarks serve a dual function: they distinguish goods in commerce and
identify ownership of a particular product. 71 These functions are based on the
principles of unfair competition and arise out of a combination of the two
interpretations regarding trademark law.72 Taken together, the two interpretations
prevent competitors from using the established mark and safeguard the owner's
financial investment and reputation in the mark.7 3 However, if a court chose to favor
one interpretation over the other, the outcome of a trademark conflict could vary
(3 See id. at 49-50 (noting the importance of the statute of limitations for trademark cases).
67 Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 533 (1936).
(3 See Schechter, supra note 56, at 13; see also Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 256 F.3d
1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In regard to the unjust enrichment theory of recovery, we have stated
that a plaintiff may recover a portion of a defendant's profits even where the plaintiff was not
actually injured by the defendant's unfair use of the disputed trademark."); Potter-Wrightington,
Inc. v. Ward Baking Co., 288 F. 597, 603 (D. Mass. 1923) (noting the dicta in previous eases
regarding an owner's goodwill should be considered as the majority approach because of the changes
in business practices and morals).
(3 Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 22.
70 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 3:1; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,
164 (1995) (noting the purpose of trademarks is to identify ownership and differentiate products in
the market place); see also gonorallyAmicus Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law
Ass'n in Support of Respondents at 3, Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No.
01-1015), 2002 WL 1929519, at *3 (noting the dual function of trademark law is to prevent confusion
and mistake, andto preserve fair competition and the owner's goodwill investment).
7115 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 3:1-12; see also Qualitex Co., 514

U.S. at 164.
721 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at §§ 2:1-6; see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("The law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition.").
73 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 270-72 (noting trademark law is
designed to protect the quality of a mark thereby protecting owner and the public from
misrepresentation); see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 17:9 ("[A] trademark is not only a symbol
of origin, but a symbol of a level of quality," thus implying that trademarks deserve substantial
protection because it affects an owner's reputation as well as the consumer's perception).
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substantially.7 4 The following section illustrates the impact each interpretation has
on the trademark rights of the colleges and universities affected by the NCAA mascot
and imagery ban.

A. A NecessaryPropositionRegarding the NCAA Native American Mascot and
Imagery Policy
It is important to begin with the proposition that the NCAA has effectively
taken the trademarks of its member institutions.7 5 Even though each member
supposedly has a choice to comply with the demands of the NCAA,76 the choice
between hosting post-season athletic events, playing any desired school, and being a
member of the only body governing college athletics, on the one hand, and continuing
to use a trademark, on the other, is hardly a choice. 7 7 Even members of Congress
have taken note of the NCAA's monopolistic and overbearing influence, as
demonstrated by recent proposed legislation regulating the NCAA's policing power on
collegiate athletics. 7 8 Thus, this comment assumes the proposition that the NCAA
has taken the marks of its member institutions. Accordingly, any remedy for that
deprivation ultimately depends on a court's preference for one interpretation of
trademark law's purposes over the other.

B. Application of the FirstInterpretationto the NCAA Native American Mascot and
Imagery Ban
If a court follows the first interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark
law, which requires a defendant to actually use a mark in a competing or diluting
manner to be held liable under the Lanham Act, a school would be afforded no
redress.7 9 In Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 80 the court
denied the plaintiffs infringement claim because there was no diversion of trade from
the plaintiff to the defendant. 81 In that case, the defendant never engaged in selling
commercial ice cream, whereas the plaintiff was incorporated solely to manufacture
and sell that exact product; the only similarity between the parties was a common
name. 82 Naturally, the court decided that there was no competition between the
74 See Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 14-30 (discussing whether competition is needed for a
trademark violation and the possible problems that could arise were a court to favor one purpose
over another).
7, See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (detailing the exact requirements of the NCAA
mascot and imagery policy).
76 Id.
77 See Franklin, supra note 4, at 436-37 (noting the overbearing power of the NCAA and
serious economic effects of not hosting post-season events); see also Fulda, supra note 4, at 167-73
(exploring the purpose of the NCAA and the revenue produced as a result of being a member).
78 See H.R. 5289, 109th Cong. (2006) (providing college and universities with a cause of action
against any entity that improperly regulates intercollegiate activities).
79 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
80 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
81 Id. at 514.
82 Id.
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parties because the defendant was not using a product against the interest of the
83
plaintiff and, therefore, there was no valid trademark cause of action.
Similarly here, the NCAA is not using a mark against its member institutions,
nor is it diverting trade from them. Rather, the NCAA is regulating college athletics
and promoting an environment that accomplishes its mission.8 4 While a school could
argue that the mascot ban does not accomplish that mission, there are no Lanham
Act violations according to proponents of the first interpretation because the NCAA is
not using a mark against the interest of the owners.85 As a result, the NCAA's
pretrial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim would likely succeed and the
ban would be upheld.

C Application of the Second Interpretationto the NCAA Native American Mascot
and Imagery Ban
In contrast, a school would have a valid cause of action against the NCAA if a
court adopts the second interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark law.
According to proponents of that view, an owner's financial investment, goodwill and
86
reputation deserve protection, regardless of use and competition by an opponent.
In Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co.,87 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the mere
probability of a diversion of trade and likelihood of confusion as a result of the
defendant's actions was enough to warrant an injunction even though the actual
injury had not occurred.88 There, the defendant manufactured hats bearing a mark
similar to that of plaintiffs magazine symbol.8 9 Though the products were not in
competition and targeted different markets, the potential economic injury suffered by
the plaintiff was enough to give rise to a valid trademark cause of action. 90
Likewise here, the NCAA would be liable to the colleges and universities under
the second interpretation even though it did not use a mark against its member
institutions. The argument for the schools against the NCAA has three major
components.

83 Id. at 514-15.
84 Gary T. Brown, Policy Applies Core Principles to Mascot Issue, THE NCAA NEWS, Aug. 15,

2005, at 1; see also NCAA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 2, at 3 (detailing the core principles of the
NCAA).
85 See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (detailing the compliance requirements of the
NCAA Native American mascot and imagery ban).
86 See Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 22-25 (discussing the trends of courts in providing
protection for plaintiffs based solely on one's goodwill as opposed to deprivation of trade); see also
Paulsson Geophysical Servs. Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008) (granting protection to
a trademark owner based on the threat to the trademark owner's goodwill); White Tower Sys., Inc.
v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1937) (suggesting an owner's
goodwill and reputation define the limits of a trademark owner's rights).
87 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
88 Id. at 512.
89 Id. at 509-10.
90 Id. at 512.
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First, the NCAA has severely devalued the financial investment of each school. 91
The ban prohibits each school from continuing to sell merchandise bearing its
established mark. 92 In effect, the ban potentially deprives each school of millions of
dollars in revenue and renders the mark virtually useless. 93 It also prevents a school
from hosting post-season events, which can yield national exposure and millions of
dollars in licensing and revenue. 94 The mere threat of such devaluation cannot go
95
unpunished. As Justice Kennedy suggested in Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
"a holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of the mark's capacity to
serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the damage is done and the
96
distinctiveness of the mark has been eroded."
Second, the ban harms the goodwill of the schools because of the effect it has on
an owner's relationship with the customer. 97 By taking away an established mark,
the ban significantly impairs the public's ability to identify a particular mark with a
specific school. 98 It also disrupts a customer's ability to make a statement regarding
his or her allegiances. 99 Courts tend to frown upon any disruption of a consumer's
ability to identify a mark with an owner, because it significantly impedes the
efficiency of the marketplace. 100
Last, the ban may give schools a trademark cause of action because it harms the
reputation of each school. 10 1 Reputations deserve protection because, as Judge
91 See Brian Goff, Effects of UniversityAthletics on the University.*A Review and Extension of
EmpiriealAssussmunt,in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 65, 66 (John Fizel & Rodney Fort eds.,
2004) (discussing the revenues obtained by becoming an NCAA member and the money spent in
developing a school's reputation).
92 See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (describing the requirements of the policy).
93 See Goff supra note 91, at 76 (analyzing the revenue gained from a school's merchandise);
see also Wright, supra note 5, at 293-94 (providing an example of the amount of money invested in
and derived from a school's name and logo).
9 See Goff supra note 91, at 74 (discussing the financial impact of hosting post-season events
in college athletics); see also Fulda, supra note 4, at 169 (detailing the revenues gained by each
major college sport conference as well as the possible gains involved in hosting championship and
post-season events); Joel G. Maxcy, The 1997 Restructuring of the NCAA: A Transactions Cost
Explanation, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 11, 26-33 (John Fizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004)
(analyzing the financial impact of post-season events).
95 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
96 Id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97 See Revlon, Inc. v. La Maur, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 602, 605 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (holding the
purpose of trademarks is to serve as a type of warranty to purchasers, thereby forming a
relationship between the customer and an owner); see also Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra
note 37, at 271-72 (noting the important relationship between trademarks and the confidences they
instill in the public's purchasing behavior).
98 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 271-72 (discussing an owner's
interest in maintaining a certain quality of goods to promote efficiency and to gain revenue); see also
Posner, Parody, supra note 37, at 75 ("A trademark seeks to economize on information costs by
providing compact, memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a product of service.").
99 See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the impact a trademark has on the consuming public and the correlation between one's
appearance and one's expression).
100 Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 37, at 270-72.
101 See id. at 270-79 (analyzing the relationship between a particular mark and the customer's
perception regarding the quality of that mark); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006) (noting the
impact a trademark has on an owner's reputation); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (discussing the importance of an owner's reputation in
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Learned Hand noted, "a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator ....102 Arguably, a school that has adopted a Native American mark sought
10 3
to establish a reputation that its teams are bold, honorable, courageous, and brave.
The NCAA ban has not only prohibited a school from establishing such a reputation
in that way, but it has also labeled schools displaying Native American imagery as
racist, thus destroying a school's reputation altogether. 10 4 Such labeling has
negative connotations, especially for schools seeking to gain national exposure and
higher enrollment. 105
However, the NCAA can counter argue that the Native American trademarks
are in direct violation of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, regardless of the fact that
the NCAA did not use a mark. That section provides that registration, and therefore
protection, of a trademark may be denied if the mark "consists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely
suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
6
symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute .... ,,10
The misuse of Native
American mascots and imagery could be considered immoral and offensive to the
general public. 107 Accordingly, the NCAA may argue that a school never had a valid
trademark, and therefore does not have a legitimate trademark cause of action.
Ultimately, a court is likely to rule in favor of a school if the court adopts the
second interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark protection. The NCAA ban
infringes on an owner's investment, goodwill, and reputation, all of which deserve
protection under the second interpretation.108 As a result of this substantial impact,

trademark protection); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
(stating the purpose of trademarks is to maintain the quality of trademark by securing an owner's
reputation with the consuming public).
102Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
103 See Christian Dennie, Native American Mascots and Team Names: Throw Away the Key,"
The Lanham Act is Locked for Future Trademark Challenges, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
197, 213-14 (2005) (discussing the reputation a team seeks to portray by adopting Native American
mascots and imagery); see also Roger Clegg, American Indian Nicknames and Mascots for Team
Sports: Law,Polcy, and Attitude, 1 VA.SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 274, 278-79 (2002) (discussing the
reasons teams adopt Native American nicknames and mascots).
104 See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (implying that schools who display "hostile and
abusive racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or imagery" are racist); see also Wright,
supra note 5, at 303-09 (discussing the public's view that Native American imagery and terms are
overall seen as racist); see also generally Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705
(T.T.A.B. 1999) (analyzing the public's view pertaining to the use of Native American imagery and
terms).
1051See Franklin, supra note 4, at 462 (suggesting that the continued use of Native American
imagery may be seen as racist and could have an effect on a school's enrollment).
106 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006).
107 See Wright, supra note 5, at 303-09 (discussing the views regarding the use of Native
American imagery and terms); see also generally Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1705 (analyzing
the public's view pertaining to the use of Native American imagery and terms).
108See Kotabs, Inc. v. Kotex Co., 50 F.2d 810, 813 (3d Cir. 1931) (noting that competition and
usage by an opponent is not necessary to enforce a trademark owner's rights); Yale Elec. Corp. v.
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (suggesting an owner's goodwill and investment may be
enough to warrant court interference); Gen. Baking Co. v. Gorman, 3 F.2d 891, 893 (1st Cir. 1925)
(noting an owner's goodwill and investment are always taken into consideration in a trademark
dispute, regardless of use by an opponent); see also Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 22-26 (noting
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the NCAA's motion to dismiss would likely fail and a school would have a possible
trademark infringement or dilution claim against the NCAA Native American
mascot and imagery ban.

D. Summary- What is the Impact ofEitherInterpretation?
In summary, one school may have a successful trademark claim against the
NCAA, while another school in the exact same situation may not, depending on
which interpretation the court decides to use. The fact that the same case could be
decided two different ways is what makes the trademark issue implicated by the
NCAA Native American mascot and imagery ban extremely complicated. 10 9 Given
that schools are still affected by the ban and may be considering challenging the
NCAA on a trademark basis, this comment proposes that courts should adopt the
second interpretation.

I1. PROPOSAL
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the different impacts a court's
interpretation can have on the rights of a trademark owner. Specifically, a school's
challenge to the NCAA mascot ban can generate two very different outcomes
depending on the trademark law a court chooses to emphasize. The following section
proposes that courts should follow the second interpretation regarding the purpose of
trademark law, and provides suggestions about what a school should present in order
to persuade such courts.

A. Courts Should Follow the ProtectiveApproach Beca use of the SubstantialImpact
the Native American Mascot Ban has on a School's Goodwill andInvestment
First, a court should follow the interpretation that protects the owner's
investment to avoid the severe financial consequences the NCAA Native American
mascot ban imposes on schools and to promote an efficient economy. 110 On its
surface, the ban does not technically take the mark away from a school.11 Rather, it
provides that schools that continue to display such hostile and abusive imagery will

that some courts believe competition is not necessary and instead award protection based solely on
business ethics, fairness, and an owner's goodwill).
109See SHILLING, supra note 37, at 12-13 (noting the difficulty in regulating trademarks
because of the dependence on a future state of mind); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 21, § 25 emt. b (1995) (discussing the complexity encompassed in
trademark protection and regulation).
110 See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (noting that consequences for failing to comply
with the NCAA mascot policy include the inability to host any NCAA post-season or championship
events).
111 Soo id. (noting the requirements placed on each school in order to be considered in
compliance with the policy, which does not necessarily include abandoning the trademark
altogether).
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not be allowed to host post-season and championship athletic events. 112 However,
this prohibition places a school in a position where not complying with the NCAA
regulation significantly disadvantages it in terms of national recognition, athletic
competition, revenue and enrollment. As a result, the NCAA ban should be seen as a
taking. 113
This taking essentially strips a school of its financial investment, including
millions of dollars spent on consumer development,
advertising, and
merchandising. 114 The ban also severely damages a school's goodwill because the
consuming public is now prevented from identifying a mark with a particular school
and buying any product bearing the name of the school it supports. 115 This prevents
the individual expression of one's allegiances and threatens the relationship between
a school and its fan base, a relationship that is economically and socially
significant. 116 The mascot ban also damages the reputation of each school because it
labels each school with a "hostile and abusive" trademark as racist. 117 Such negative
connotations associated with a school inevitably have drastic and detrimental impact
1 18
on both consumer support and enrollment.
Additionally, a court should adopt the protective approach because the NCAA
ban violates the principles of unfair competition, the foundation of trademark law. 119
112See generallyid. (noting colleges and universities may adopt any mascot or imagery it likes,
but further emphasizing "hostile and abusive" imagery will not be allowed or tolerated at NCAA
post-season championship events). The press release also recommends other schools not schedule
events with schools that do not comply with the NCAA requests and demands that schools not use
"hostile and abusive" Native American imagery on its uniforms. Id.
113 See Franklin, supra note 17, at 436-37 (noting the overbearing power of the NCAA and the
significant economic effects of not hosting post-season events); see also Fulda, supra note 17, at 16773 (noting the coercive power of the NCAA and impact national exposure has on each school).
114 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 276 (noting the amount of money
spent in creating, advertising, and promoting a trademark); Fulda, supra note 4, at 169 (detailing
the revenues gained by each major college sport conference and the factors considered in making
calculation).
115 See Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079,
1084 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting the impact a trademark has on the consuming public); Int'l Order of
Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980) (discussing the relationship
between one's purchasing patterns and one's expression or identification); see also Hiaring, supra
note 21, at 13 (noting the correlation between the public's association of a certain mark and the
strength of the owner's rights).
116 Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow Girls, 676 F.2d at 1084; Int'l Order of Jobs
Daughters, 633 F.2d at 918; see also Landes & Posner, TrademarkLaw, supra note 37, at 267-72
(recognizing the importance of trademarks and the benefits they provide in assisting the consuming
public); SMITH, supra note 37, at 129-58 (evaluating the benefits of trademarks and the relationship
between a mark and individual expression).
117 Se Fulda, supra note 4, at 166-67 (discussing the differing views regarding the Chief
Illiniwek controversy and highlighting the arguments made by both sides regarding whether Native
American mascots reflect poorly on a schools reputation); see also LOUIS B. GARIPPO, THE CHIEF
ILLINIWEK DIALOGUE: INTENT AND TRADITION VS. REACTION AND HISTORY, A REPORT TO THE BOARD
OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, http://www.uillinois.edu/trustees/dialogue/
report files/toc.html (last visited Sep. 3, 2008) (highlighting the negative connotations the mascot
ban has on a school's reputation).
118 See Franklin, supra note 4, at 462 (suggesting that the continued use of Native American
imagery, if seen as racist, would have an impact on a school's overall enrollment).
11) Se 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 1:1-25 (explaining the concept of unfair competition and
its relationship with trademark law); see also Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380

[7:735 2008]

Honoring Trademarks

Prohibition of unfair competition promotes an efficient and fair market economy, 120
and any disruption of the fair market place is actionable. 121 Here, the NCAA is
prohibiting each school from continuing to compete in the free market economy
because the ban takes away a mark of identification. A court should recognize this
unfairness and correct it, even if it does not acknowledge the financial and social
hardships placed on each school.
Above all, a court should follow the protective approach because of the property
rights encompassed in a trademark. 122 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Borden Ice
Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 123 "[glood will or business popularity is

124
property, and, like other property, will be protected against fraudulent invasion."
In terms of trademark law, the owner's actual use of a mark limits the property right
encompassed in a trademark. 125 The exclusive right to use a mark remains so long
as the owner's use does not interfere with the rights of another. 126 With respect to
the ban, no college or university is affecting the trademark rights of another, as
evidenced by the fact that no school has made an infringement or dilution claim
against another school. 127 Nor is the NCAA asserting an infringement or dilution
claim against the schools. 128 Thus, the property right to exclude others, including the
NCAA, from using or taking a school's mark still exists and is even stronger because
of the lack of adversity.
Taking all of this into consideration, a court faced with deciding the trademark
implications of the NCAA mascot ban should adopt the protective approach, a more
expansive interpretation of trademark rights. This view provides greater protection

(1926) ("[T]he general purpose of [unfair competition] is to prevent one person from passing off his
goods or his business as the goods or business of another.").
120 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 267-79 (discussing the role
trademarks play in keeping the market economy as efficient as possible).
121 Id.; see also Schopflocher, supra note 30, at 14 (evaluating the consequences for violating
those principles).
122 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:10-14 (noting trademark owners have an exclusive
right to use the mark); see also Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259
(1916) (recognizing the property right of a trademark and the exclusive right to exclude others).
123 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
124 Jd. at 513; see also Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (observing that trademarks are not separate property rights, but are "integral and
inseparable elements of the goodwill" of the businesses to which they belong).
125 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29-31 (ist Cir. 1987).
126 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:10-14 (noting that the property right encompassed in a
trademark grants the owner the exclusive right to a use a mark so long as the owner's use does not
interfere with the rights of another owner); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 414 (1916) (holding the use of a trademark is limited by the property right inherent in
trademarks, which is an exclusive right to use and enjoy the mark); Union Nat'l Bank of Tex.,
Laredo, Tex. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting
that the exclusive right to exclude others from using one's trademark does not extend to "areas
where he does not currently do business nor is likely to do business in the future").
127 See Glenn George, Playing Cowboys and Indians, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 90, 99 (2006)
(noting that the NCAA's decision to ban Native American mascots and imagery from post-season
events caused schools to challenge the NCAA, thus implying that no school brought a trademark
cause of action against another school).
128 See NCAA Mascot Guidelines, supra note 3 (detailing the Native American mascot and
imagery policy but noting that schools are free to adopt any mascot and image it chooses, which
implicitly suggests that the NCAA is not bringing a trademark suit against the schools).
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to trademark owners because it takes into account an owner's investment and does
not require a defendant to use a mark to violate an owner's right. Courts should
adopt this approach given the amount of money involved in a university's trademark,
including development, merchandising and licensing.

B. Winning the Case - What Evidence a Sehool Should Presentto Persuade a Court
to Adopt the ProtectiveApproach
Of course, persuading the court to adopt the second interpretation that gives an
owner the right to bring a trademark claim is only half the battle. A school
challenging the NCAA's mascot ban needs to present strong evidence to survive the
NCAA's likely motion for to dismiss, much less prevail at trial.
First, a school should present evidence proving the amount of money spent
creating and developing the mark as well as the money spent in establishing its
reputation.129 This evidence could include advertising costs and market studies
13 0
showing that the public identifies a particular mark with a particular school.
Second, a school should provide evidence of revenue generated from the trademark,
including all sales, merchandising, and licensing income. 131 Third, a school should
present evidence that shows that the NCAA's label of "harmful and abusive" leads
the public to conclude that the specific school is racist. 132 Finally, a school should
prove that its mark is not competing with or diluting the mark of another, whether
against another school or any other trademark owner.1 33 Together, this evidence
demonstrates a school's dependence on its mark and shows that the mark is
established, thereby hopefully persuading a court to rule in its favor.

CONCLUSION

The NCAA has received much criticism since announcing the Native American
mascot and imagery ban on August 5, 2005. Arguments against the ban have
included civil rights, First Amendment, and antitrust violations. 13 4 The ban also

129 See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law, supra note 37, at 276 (noting the amount of money
spent in creating, advertising, and promoting a trademark).
130 See Id. at 270-77 (discussing how consumer recognition of a product in commerce impacts
an owner's rights).
131 See Fulda, supra note 4, at 169 (detailing the revenues gained by schools as a result of
merchandising and licensing); see also Wright, supra note 5, at 293-94 (providing an example of the
amount of money spent and gained from merchandise bearing a school's trademark).
132 See Wright, supra note 5, at 303-09 (discussing the views regarding the use of Native
American imagery and terms based on linguistic experts and survey analysis); see also generally
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999) (analyzing the public's view
regarding to the use of Native American imagery and terms).
133 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:10-14 (stating that a trademark owner's right to use
the mark is absolute and exclusive provided that the owner's use does not interfere with the rights
of another trademark owner).
134 See Moushegian, supra note 4, at 475-76 (detailing the First Amendment and Civil Right
Act violations encompassed in the use of Native American imagery); see also Franklin, supra note 4,
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includes trademark implications, although no school has yet challenged the ban on
these grounds.13 5 The primary reason no school has challenged the ban on
trademark grounds is the fear that a court may choose to follow the first
interpretation regarding trademark law, which requires a defendant to actually use a
136
mark against an owner's interest.
Preferably, however, the second interpretation protects an owner's investment,
goodwill, and reputation. 137 Under that interpretation, regardless of the fact that the
NCAA has not used a mark against the interest of any school, a school should still be
entitled to trademark protection because the ban has significantly injured its
investment, goodwill, and reputation. Moreover, the ban takes away a school's
exclusive right to use its established mark - one of the foundations of trademark
law. 1 38 The right to use isthe lynchpin of trademark law and is one of the "nicer
sensibilities" 139 encompassed in trademark protection. Accordingly, a court should
adopt the second interpretation regarding the purpose of trademark law, award the
schools with a valid trademark cause of action, and award relief where appropriate.

at 447-48 (2006) (discussing the Sherman Antitrust Act's effect on the NCAA mascot policy); Fulda,
supra note 4, at 173-87 (analyzing whether the NCAA's mascot policy restrains free trade).
135 See Wright, supranote 5, at 292-96 (detailing the effect the Harjo decision had on a school's
ability to make a trademark claim against the NCAA).
136 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); Am. Express Co. v. Goetz,
515 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2008); Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264,
267-69 (4th Cir. 2003).
137 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (commenting on the
ability of trademark law to protect a product's high quality while simultaneously preventing others
from selling inferior products); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)
(discussing the two purposes of trademark protection and elaborating on the causes available to
trademark owners); see also I MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 3:1 (elaborating on the two different
purposes of trademark law).
138 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, §§ 2:10-14 (discussing the exclusive right to a use a mark
provided that the owner's use does not interfere with the rights of another owner); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115 (2006) (noting that using a trademark in commerce entitles the owner to the exclusive right
to use that mark so long as that use does not affect the rights of other trademark owners).
131)Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).

